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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
  Amici curiae are a group of professors of law and 
economics with expertise in antitrust and the economics of 
competition.  They submit this brief in order to bring their 
economic analysis of global price-fixing cartels – in terms 
both of effects and deterrence – before the Court:
1 
  Darren Bush is Assistant Professor of Law at the 
University of  Houston Law Center. 
  John M. Connor is Professor of Agricultural 
Economics at Purdue University. 
  John J. Flynn is Professor of Law and Hugh B. Brown 
Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Utah.  
  Shubha Ghosh is Associate Professor of Law at the 
SUNY-Buffalo School of Law. 
  Warren Grimes is Professor of Law at Southwestern 
University School of Law. 
  Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. is Professor of Economics at 
Johns Hopkins University.  
  Norman Hawker is Associate Professor of Law at 
Western Michigan University. 
  Robert Lande is the Venable Professor of Law at the 
University of Baltimore. 
                                                 
1Amicus Professor John M. Connor has written extensively on the 
law and economics of global price-fixing conspiracies and is 
among the leading scholars of the vitamins cartel that is the 
subject of the instant action.  Professor Connor undertook initial 
drafting of this brief, which relies heavily upon his published 
scholarship.  In compliance with Rule 37.6, amici state that no 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that 
no person other than amici  or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief.  The 
university affiliations of amici are provided for identification 




   William G. Shepherd is Professor Emeritus of 
Economics at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 
  Steven Semeraro is Assistant Professor of Law at the 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has witnessed nothing less than an 
explosion in the discovery of private international cartels 
with global price-fixing ambitions.
2  This brief presents two 
major economic arguments in support of the decision below.  
First, in the context of international price-fixing conspiracies 
conduct relating to “wholly foreign” purchases necessarily 
affects domestic commerce.  This is because international 
cartels must prevent international geographic arbitrage in 
order to succeed in controlling prices in any targeted national 
market.  
Second, this brief assembles empirical evidence that, in 
the absence of affirmance of the judgment below, the global 
aspirations of contemporary cartels offer an insuperable 
challenge to a core aim of the antitrust laws: Deterrence.   
The broad geographic harm generated by the scores of 
modern global price-fixing conspiracies has overwhelmed 
the ability of corporate antitrust sanctions to provide enough 
financial disincentives to discourage the formation of similar 
cartels in the future.  These sanctions have been inadequate 
to deter cartel formation because the probability of being 
caught by one or more of the world’s antitrust authorities 
                                                 
2 During 2000-2003 the world’s antitrust authorities have had to 
cope on average with 23 newly discovered international cartels per 
year; in the first half of the 1990s, fewer than four were discovered 
each year on average.  Connor, “Private International Cartels: 
Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement,”(“Private 
International Cartels”), Research in Agricultural and Applied 






remains well below 100% and because the expected illegal 
monopoly profits made worldwide are more than sufficient 
to compensate would-be conspirators for their expected 
liabilities in jurisdictions with effective antitrust laws and 
enforcement.
3  Permitting foreign buyers who purchased the 
products of international cartels abroad to pursue civil 
antitrust damages actions in U.S. courts is necessary to 
produce the level of damages needed to protect the U.S. 
economy and its consumers from future cartel injuries.   
Affirmance will also enhance the probability of discovery of 
clandestine cartels by multiplying the number of jurisdictions 
in which private parties have an incentive to investigate 
collusive behavior. 
The purpose of this brief is to validate these conclusions 
by drawing upon research on private international cartels 
published in the past six years. To do so, this brief will 
describe in concrete detail the salient economic features of 
the global vitamins cartel; calculations of the amount of 
injury caused for buyers in the United States and elsewhere; 
corporate financial sanctions imposed; the ways in which 
this cartel are similar to others prosecuted in the past decade; 
evidence of recidivism in international price fixing; and how 
deterrence will be significantly enhanced should wholly 
foreign direct buyers be permitted to go forward with this 
and similar suits under the Sherman Act.  
                                                 
3  The OECD presents survey data from a large number of 
countries showing that national antitrust fines imposed on 
international cartels in the late 1990s failed to recover single 
damages.  Organization of Economic Co-Operation and 
Development, Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core 
Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels Under National Competition 
Laws (April 9, 2002), Annex A available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/20/2081831.pdf.  Another study 
also concluded that deterrence of contemporary cartels by national 
antitrust authorities is insufficient.  Evenett, Levenstein, and 
Suslow, “International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 




This research demonstrates that the international vitamin 
cartel generated the largest total of antitrust fines and 
penalties in history, which are calculated to be between $4.4 
and $5.6 billion.  But the cartel’s monopoly profits in all 
areas of the world were $9 to $13 billion.  Thus, the criminal 
and civil justice systems of the globe produced fines and 
damages that amounted to only about half of this cartel's 
illegal profits.  These sanctions are much less than the 
amount needed to discourage future cartel formation. One of 
the best ways to discourage cartels is to increase the 
expected costs in the event the participants are caught, in 
order that the expected penalties exceed the expected 
benefits.  As a practical matter, this deterrence benefit to the 
United States' consumers and its economy – something 
surely intended by Congress – is likely to be achieved only if 
federal law is construed to give injured foreign customers 
like Respondents the power to sue in the courts of the United 
States under American antitrust laws. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE VITAMINS CARTEL, 1990-1999. 
Decisions about raising the prices of vitamins A and 
E began in discussions in Switzerland and Germany among 
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, BASF, and Rhône-Poulenc (now 
Aventis) in late 1989.
4  Soon afterward the Japanese 
chemical manufacturer Eisai agreed to raise the price of 
                                                 
4 Information about the cartel is drawn from published sources, 
including Connor, Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are the 
Enemy (“Global Price Fixing”) 277-337, 368-379, 405-407, 463-
476 (2001), supplemented by scores of publicly available press 
accounts.  A particularly rich source of information is the 
European Commission’s decision of November 21, 2001.  See 
Commission Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, Commission 
Decision of November 21, 2001 (“EC Vitamins Case”), reprinted 
in L-6 Official Journal of the European Communities 1 
(10.1.2003) available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/ 




vitamin E effective January 1990.  It was logical for the 
conspirators to begin with vitamins A and E because they 
had the largest sales of the 16 products that would eventually 
be cartelized, were dominated by the four manufacturers (at 
least 87% of global supply), and were well protected from 
entry by new sellers because of the difficulty of the synthetic 
chemistry involved.
5  The number of cartelized products 
grew to eight by January 1991, and by the end of 1991 at 
least 20 parent-company manufacturers would be involved in 
a conspiracy involving 16 products.  
    With respect to two products, price fixing was 
effective for only four years, but with respect to most this 
was a durable conspiracy.  Price fixing of vitamin H became 
ineffective in April 1994 after 30 months of operation, and 
the cartel ceased price control of vitamin C shortly thereafter 
because of a flood of Chinese exports induced by cartel-
inflated high prices. However, with respect to many products 
the cartel was still effectively raising prices above non-
collusive levels in February 1999 when definitive evidence 
of the conspiracy came into the hands of DOJ from a 
company seeking leniency in exchange for cooperation.   
With respect to one product, the cartel was active for nearly 
11 years; with respect to several others, the cartel operated 
effectively for nearly ten years. 
                                                 
5 The products ultimately involved were vitamins A, B1, B2, B3 
(niacin), B4 (choline chloride), B5, B6, B9 (folic acid), B12, C, 
D3, and H (biotin); three carotinoids; and vitamin premixes.  The 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Canadian Competition Bureau 
(CBC), and European Commission fined the defendants for 
violations with respect to different combinations of these 16 
products.  For example, only the DOJ fined firms for premixes, 
only the CBC for B12, and only the EC for D3; however all three 






    Whether tracked in euros, U.S. dollars, or Swiss 
francs, market prices in the United States, Canada, and 
Western Europe began to rise almost immediately after 
higher list prices were announced by the vitamins 
manufacturers.
6  In the cases of some products prices peaked 
just before the cartel was exposed; in others they peaked 
years before the cartel’s ability to fix prices with respect to 
that product dissolved.  But in all cases, selling prices rose to 
levels greater than those observed prior to the collusive 
agreements and well above those observed after they broke 
apart.  The price increases cannot be fully explained by 
either increases in production cost or by unexpected surges 
in demand.  The pattern of price changes in North America 
and Europe are remarkably parallel.  Prices in all other parts 
of the world were similarly affected, though the average 
overcharges may have varied slightly from those observed in 
North America or Western Europe.
7 
    Besides setting list prices and rigging bids on tenders 
from larger customers, the vitamin makers engaged in much 
other conduct in order to assure the success of their 
conspiracy to fix prices.  Global Price Fixing, supra n. 4, 
305-317.  They agreed on global and regional sales quotas, 
generally based on historical levels.  They shared production 
and sales information to monitor their adherence to prices 
and market allocations.  They developed plans to thwart 
entry by producers outside the collusive groups. They set 
many common terms of sale, such as discounts, delivery, and 
restrictions on customers’ resales.   
                                                 
6 See EC Vitamins Case 86-89; Global Price Fixing 319-331. 
7 An official statement describing the price effects in South Korea, 
for example, which imports all its vitamin supplies, confirms the 
similarity in price effects.  Korea Fair Trade Commission, “The 
KFTC Imposes Surcharges on the International Cartel of Vitamin 





The cartel was managed through three levels of 
managers; the lowest level had face-to-face meetings 
quarterly to adjust prices in several currencies.  The 
frequency of these meetings is instructive.  Although with 
respect to each product the cartel had impressive 
coordination of total industry supply and market prices, it 
had a limited ability to affect changes in demand and no 
power over currency exchange rates.  With few exceptions, 
the markets into which the vitamins cartel sold products had 
floating currency exchange rates that moved daily in 
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. 
Moreover, it is important to note that bulk vitamins were 
high priced, storable commodities that were usually shipped 
in large quantities great distances.
8  International shipping 
costs for vitamins in the 1990s were well under 5% of the 
manufacturers’ price.
9  Under such conditions, if changes in 
                                                 
8 The majority of the cartel’s members had most of their vitamin 
factories in Europe, from which they exported the majority of the 
output to other continents.  The majority of U.S. consumption was 
satisfied by imports.  During the affected periods, vitamin A sold 
for $100-$200/lb., vitamin E for $60-$90/lb., vitamin C $30-
$40/lb., and most of the other vitamins in between.    
9  Europe-U.S. and Europe-Asia transportation costs for these 
products were less than $1/lb. These low oceanic transport rates 
can be inferred from data published by UNCTAD, see United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development,  World Maritime 
Transport 1998 71 (1998), which shows that for all commodities 
the ratio of transport costs to import value was 5% in 1990 and 
1995; most internationally traded goods are much lower in price 
than organic chemicals, which is what vitamins are.  Other 
evidence was supplied in exhibits submitted in the lysine trial 
United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762 (N.D. Ill.).  See Global 
Price Fixing 217-219.  ADM spent only $0.10 to $0.13 per pound 
in transporting, storing, and merchandising lysine made in Illinois 
and shipped everywhere in the world at a time when lysine sold 
for merely $0.85 to $1.25 per pound.  Lysine international transfer 
costs were thus from 8% to 15% of sales value, yet the lysine-




currency exchange rates were sharp enough, buyers would 
find it profitable to sell stored vitamins from countries with 
depreciated currencies to countries with appreciated 
currencies; prices in the latter areas would then fall below 
the cartel’s preferred levels.  This is called geographic 
arbitrage.    
    Arbitrage undermines the ability of international 
cartels to set prices at the most profitable level in each 
currency zone and could even destroy collusive 
arrangements.  For example, during 1990-1998 the value of 
the U.S. dollar relative to the Deutschmark varied by as 
much as 41%, and during 1991 the rates changed by more 
than 25%. Consider what might happen if the vitamins cartel 
set the national prices of its vitamins only once each year.  If 
the vitamins cartel set the price of vitamin E in 
Deutschmarks when this currency was weak against the 
dollar, a U.S. chemical wholesaler could make a quick and 
handsome profit by exporting the vitamin to Germany when 
the Deutschmark later strengthened.
10  The cartel would sell 
a greater amount of vitamins at a relatively low price in the 
United States but would lose the high priced sales in 
Germany to this entrepreneurial exporter.  If sales diversions 
of this type became large enough, the total monopoly profits 
could decline to a level inadequate to compensate the cartel 
members for their legal risk.  Many cartels attempt to forbid 
the practice of reselling by their customers.  But the only 
                                                                                                    
See infra at 9.  In terms of its ability to enter international trade, 
lysine is very much like most bulk vitamins, a powder that must be 
protected from humidity.  
10  In 1991 the Deutschmark was worth as little as $0.55 and 
appreciated to $0.69.  See  http://www.oanda.com/convert/fx 
history.  Even if transportation costs were a generous 5% of export 
costs, by timing its purchase and resale correctly our hypothetical 
U.S. wholesaler could sell at a net increase in price of 20% and 
make a much higher mark-up on the export transaction than it 
would make in the U.S. market. If the dollar strengthened against 




way cartelists can effectively prevent geographic arbitrage is 
to make it unprofitable by frequently resetting domestic 
cartel prices in all regions of the world using current 
exchange rates to ensure that prices remain close together.   
    We know from direct evidence that comparable 
cartels were conscious of the problem presented by 
geographic arbitrage. Despite the increased danger of 
discovery, most modern cartels have had quarterly meetings 
to deal with this problem.  In its three years of operation, the 
well-documented lysine cartel had at least 23 face-to-face 
meetings in order to adjust local prices in various currencies 
whenever exchange movements got the cartel’s prices out of 
line for maximum profitability.  Global Price Fixing 203.   
During that cartel’s first few months of operation, the price 
was set in U.S. dollars only.  By the end of the cartel, prices 
were set in at least nine currencies.  Id. 238.  A memorandum 
of a meeting of the cartel in Paris in 1993 written by an 
executive of the Ajinomoto Co. specifically refers to the 
need to combat geographic arbitrage by non-cooperative 
wholesalers: 
    With the [Deutschmark] strong against the $, 
presently it is 22% higher than in the U.S.  If the 
difference between Europe and the U.S. becomes 
bigger, ill-reputed dealers will start working and 
goods will enter Europe from the U.S. and decrease 
the price.
11 
2. AFFECTED SALES OF THE VITAMINS CARTEL. 
    Although the vitamins cartel is not different in kind 
from other international cartels of the late 20
th century, it was 
one of exceptionally large scale. The most conventional 
measure of a cartel’s size is affected commerce, i.e., the sales 
revenues generated by the cartelized product during the 
                                                 
11  United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762 (N.D. Ill.), Trial 





12  The dates of effective price control by 
the vitamins cartel are well known.  Sales in the U.S., 
Canadian, and EU markets are also known with a fair degree 
of precision.
13  Sales in other parts of the world can be 
estimated as a residual amount after ascertaining the world 
totals. 
The total affected sales in the United States were 
once estimated to have been as low as $5 billion in public 
statements by DOJ officials.  See “US Slaps Two Big 
European Companies with Huge Fines in Vitamin Case,” 
Agence France Press, May 20, 1999 (quoting Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein).  This figure appears to include 
only a few of the largest vitamins, whereas subsequent 
prosecutions make it clear that the cartel involved a wider 
array of vitamins and vitamin premixes.  A reasonable 
estimate of U.S. affected sales of the full array of 16 vitamin 
products is approximately $7.4 billion. 
Sales of the vitamins cartel in the European 
Economic Area
14 were released by the European 
                                                 
12 Affected sales are normally dated from the time at which the 
first agreement was made until the date of the cartel’s last meeting.  
Another approach is to begin counting sales on the first date on 
which an agreed change in list or transaction prices were changed 
or became effective.  In this brief we follow the more conservative 
second approach.  Both approaches undercount sales in the months 
following the formal dissolution of a cartel when prices remain 
elevated above what they would otherwise be in the absence of 
unlawful collusion because of institutional lags in price cuts.   
13 Sales data for vitamin premixes are difficult to obtain, and it is 
not always clear that total published or asserted sales data for all 
vitamins include premixes.  Vitamin premixes are mixtures of bulk 
vitamins that are tailored for the nutritional needs of various types 
of farm animals.  The United States is the only jurisdiction in 
which the vitamins manufacturers were sanctioned for price fixing 
the market for premixes.   
14 The EEA includes the EU and a few other countries that are 




Commission in its published decision regarding the fines 
imposed on the conspiring manufacturers.  See EC Vitamins 
Case at 4.  The affected sales of bulk vitamins (not including 
premixes) in the EEA are estimated to have been US$8.3 
billion.  Affected sales in Canada were given in statements of 
the Canadian Competition Bureau to be C$700 to C$750 
million (US$530 to US$570).  Finally, based upon reports of 
global sales it is possible to estimate sales in the rest of the 
world (primarily Asia, Africa, and Latin America).  During 
the price-fixing period, sales of bulk vitamins in the rest of 
the world were approximately $18.2 billion.  Therefore, 
global affected commerce of bulk vitamins and premixes 
(the latter in the United States only), reached $34.3 billion – 
the largest amount of affected commerce ever to result from 
a global price-fixing cartel.
15  
    The significance of this sales calculation lies in the 
geographic location of vitamins sales during the cartel’s 
active period.  The three jurisdictions with the most effective 
anticartel enforcement – the USA, Canada, and the EU – 
accounted for less than half of worldwide sales.
16  It follows 
that, if the rate of monopoly profits made by the cartelists 
was roughly the same across the globe, then the majority of 
those profits were made in jurisdictions where anticartel 
                                                                                                    
the EU; Norway is an example.  These countries have agreed to 
allow the EC to enforce its competition laws in their national 
jurisdictions.  Harding and Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe: 
A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency 93 (2003). 
15 The largest set of affected commerce data on post-1980 
international cartels can be found in Private International Cartels.  
The intra-European cement cartel, which was fined by the EU in 
January 1992, might have been slightly larger as measured by 
affected commerce at least when adjusted for inflation.  The 
cement cartel, however, was not a global cartel in the sense being 
used in this brief.  
16The USA, Canada, and the EU accounted for 21%, 2%, and 25% 
of affected world vitamin sales, respectively. Data on file with 




enforcement is weak or nonexistent.  The ability of 
international cartelists to garner monopoly profits in weak 
antitrust jurisdictions adversely affects deterrence. 
  3. ECONOMIC INJURIES CAUSED BY THE 
VITAMINS CARTEL. 
  Numerous economic analyses have been conducted 
by economists and parties to private suits in the United 
States in which calculations of the economic injuries caused 
by vitamins price fixing were central issues.  There appears 
to be a substantial consensus among these individuals on the 
size of the vitamins cartel’s price-fixing overcharges. 
    On May 20, 1999, the day the guilty pleas of the 
three largest members of the vitamins cartel were announced, 
Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein stated: 
The vitamin cartel is the most pervasive and harmful 
criminal antitrust conspiracy ever uncovered…  The 
enormous effort that went into maintaining the 
conspiracy reflects the magnitude of the illegal 
revenues it generated… 
17 
 
Several subsequent statements by DOJ officials 
echoed the assertion that the vitamins cartel was the most 
injurious to the U.S. economy of any international price-
fixing conspiracy ever prosecuted by the United States.
18  
                                                 
17 “Press Conference with Attorney General Janet Reno and Joel 
Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,” Federal 
News Service, May 20, 1999. 
18  See,  e.g., Testimony of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney 
General, Department of Justice, before the House Judiciary 
Committee, Federal Document Clearinghouse Congressional 
Testimony, April 11, 2000.  The only other U.S. case that is a 
contender for the most harmful cartel is the heavy electric power 
equipment conspiracy that was prosecuted in 1960-61, but this was 
a solely domestic cartel and its price effects were relatively small.  




Prosecutors for the Canadian Ministry of Justice that handled 
the vitamins case were quoted in the press stating that 
vitamins prices were 30% higher than competitive levels.   
Global Price Fixing 405.  Similarly, the vitamins decision of 
the European Commission clearly concludes that the cartels 
caused a significant increase in EU prices of bulk vitamins.  
EC Vitamins Case at 69.  That fact that the three 
governments imposed on the vitamins conspirators fines that 
were the highest in history speaks for itself. 
    Unlike DOJ’s terse press releases and sentencing 
memoranda, the EC decision is exemplary in providing 
numerous details about the operations, size, and European 
price effects of the vitamins cartel.  From graphical evidence 
provided on the prices of seven vitamins, it is clear that the 
prices in euros rose significantly compared to the years 
before price fixing began.  Id. at 86-89. Moreover, the post-
cartel prices are lower than the pre-cartel prices, a trend that 
suggests that costs of production during the relevant period 
probably fell.  Therefore, applying a simple before-and-after 
technique to calculate price effects will in all likelihood 
provide estimates that understate the true overcharge.  See 
Connor, “Global Cartels Redux: The Amino Acid Lysine 
Antitrust Litigation” in Kwoka and White, eds., The 
Antitrust Revolution 263-267. (4
th ed. 2004). 
    The simple mean price-fixing overcharge in the EU 
was 29% when measured with the pre-cartel prices as the 
competitive benchmark and 38% when applying post-cartel 
prices as the benchmark (i.e., the so-called but-for price).
19  
                                                                                                    
Economic Evidence,” Staff Paper, Research in Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu 
(forthcoming 2004). 
19 These were highly concentrated markets before and during the 
collusive conduct. It is likely that tacit collusion marked the 
behavior of these industries prior to the formation of the cartels.  
Thus, the benchmark prices used here probably are above perfectly 




The price effects were highest for vitamin E, the largest 
product in terms of sales, and lowest for vitamin C, a product 
that was subject to stiff import competition from Chinese 
manufacturers after a relatively short time.  See Global Price 
Fixing 336.  If one weights the overcharges by the sales sizes 
of the individual products, the mean overcharge was 31% to 
42%. 
  In a case involving choline chloride, vitamin B4, one 
of the smaller vitamins, Mitsui, DuCoa, Chinook, and 
affiliated companies were found guilty of price-fixing in a 
conspiracy that ended in 2003.  The jury found the injury to 
be $49.5 million and awarded treble damages. See “4 
Companies Found Liable In Price Fixing Of Vitamin B4,” 
New York Times, June 15, 2003 at A20.  This overcharge 
conservatively represents 38% of affected sales. 
    Finally, there have been a number of empirical 
studies of the price effects of the vitamins cartel by academic 
economists and economic historians.  Professor Connor’s 
estimates are on average somewhat lower than the EU price 
effects: allowing for some uncertainty, he concluded the 
weighted average is 25% to 28% of affected commerce.   
Global Price Fixing 336.  In the United States, as in Europe, 
vitamin E had the highest U.S. overcharge rate and vitamin 
C one of the lowest.  Applying the U.S. overcharge rates to 
global sales results in an estimated world overcharge of $7 to 
$8 billion.  Id.  Economic historians Suslow and Levenstein 
cited North American overcharge figures of 20% and 30% in 
a survey of modern cartels.  Connor and Lande, supra n. 18, 
App. Table 2.  A sophisticated econometric model of world 
trade in bulk vitamins also yielded conclusions about 
collusive price effects.  See Clarke and Evenett, “The 
Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws: Evidence 
from the International Vitamins Cartel,” AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center Working Paper 02-13, Table 7 at 31 (2002) 
available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/ 




study is that the authors are able to calculate overcharges for 
the 19 countries outside the EU and North America with the 
strictest antitrust laws separately from those countries with 
weak antitrust enforcement; the former had overcharges 
averaging 13% while the latter incurred a 33% overcharge.  
Therefore, it seems likely that monopoly profit rates from 
collusion in the rest of the world are higher than in the 
United States, Canada and the EU.  Finally, from a cutting-
edge dynamic simulation model fitted to parameters drawn 
from the vitamin C industry, one scholar predicted the U.S. 
price during fully collusive and non-collusive regimes.  See 
de Roos, “Collusion with a Competitive Fringe: An 
Application to Vitamin C,” 20-28 (unpublished manuscript 
October 2001) available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~njd7/ 
docs/vitc.pdf.  His results are that U.S. vitamin C prices were 
22% to 26% higher during the cartel period, which is quite 
remarkable given that this is was one of the products with 
respect to which the cartel was weakest and most fragile.  
    To summarize, the average price effects of the 
vitamins cartel appear to be lowest for buyers in the United 
States, averaging somewhere in the 20% to 35% range. 
Canada and Europe were higher, roughly in the 30% to 40% 
range. The rest of the word came closer to European levels 
than to U.S. levels. Applying these price effects to the 
affected sales mentioned in the previous section implies that 
global injuries were between $9 and $13 billion, of which 
15% accrued in the United States, 1% in Canada, 26% in the 
EU, and 58% in the rest of the world. 
  4. CORPORATE CARTEL SANCTIONS. 
    The vitamins cartel has been the most harshly 
sanctioned conspiracy in antitrust history.  Private 
International Cartels, supra n. 2, at 47-49, 52-53, 56-57, 106-
111.  This section focuses on corporate monetary antitrust 
penalties, recognizing that corporate persons may be deterred 
in less measurable ways and that individuals were also 




comparison to corporate ones, and more serious personal 
criminal sanctions, may add to or interact with corporate 
sanctions in discouraging the formation or enlargement of 
cartels, but they are difficult to incorporate into a unified 
calculus of collusive deterrence. 
    Sanctions that would be imposed in the absence of an 
affirmance in the instant case will be inadequate to deter 
global price-fixing cartels. The Sentencing Guidelines, for 
example, call for a base fine of 20% of "affected sales" when 
an organization is being fined for price-fixing.  See USSG 
2R1.1(d).  These may be adjusted by a multiplier as high as 
4.0 depending upon the defendant's "culpability score.  Id. at 
8C2.6; 8C2.5.  In practice, most guilty international cartel 
participants earn culpability multipliers of from 1.5 to 3.5.  
Global Price Fixing 356-378. 
Unless global conduct is held unlawful as a matter of 
United States law, only U.S. affected sales will be used in 
calculating the base fine.  Using global sales to determine 
harm could increase the maximum liability of typical 
international price fixers by a multiple of three to six. 
Further, in discussing the economic effects of 
anticartel sanctions, it is essential to distinguish theoretically 
available legal sanctions from those actually applied as a 
matter of custom and policy.  Historically, the Government 
has also ordinarily recommended substantial downward 
departures in these cases even from the fine levels specified 
by the Guidelines.
20  Members of modern international 
cartels have been granted very large downward departures 
for minimal cooperation almost as a matter of course, driving 
actual fines down well below single U.S. damages in almost 
all cases.  Global Price Fixing 356-377.  In the vitamins case, 
                                                 
20  Amicus Connor is aware of only one instance in which a 
defendant in a global cartel was required to pay a fine close to the 
maximum amount specified in the Guidelines: Mitsubishi after an 




the second through fifth firms to plead guilty were granted 
average downward departures of about 80% from the 
Guidelines’ maximum fines.  Global Price Fixing 375. As a 
result of U.S. sentencing practices, its criminal fines 
amounted to less than 11% of the vitamins cartel’s global 
monopoly profits. 
    The EU has quite different standards for imposing its 
administrative fines, which are calculated on the basis of the 
seriousness and duration of the violation. The European 
Commission (EC) is limited to imposing a maximum fine of 
10% of a firm’s global sales in the year prior to the 
Commission’s action.  For a single-product firm with sales 
only in the EU, the maximum EU fine could be a large share 
of the profits accruing from a fairly harmful cartel.   
However, most members of global cartels are highly 
diversified firms, and the cartelized product is a small share 
of the company’s portfolio.  For example, for the leading 
member of the vitamins cartel, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, 
vitamins accounted for merely 8% of its total sales.  For such 
firms, a durable high-overcharge cartel can easily generate 
monopoly profits well above what an EU fine could possibly 
disgorge.  Moreover, as in the United States, generous 
reductions in fines are routinely granted for minimal 
cooperation with the EC. Actual fines imposed by the EC for 
the same global cartels have on average been about 20% 
lower than those imposed in the United States.  Connor, “La 
Mondalisation des Délits en Col Blanc: Les Cartels 
Agroalimentaires des Années 1990,” 277-278 Économie rurale 99, 
119 (Septembre-Décembre 2003).       
The Clayton Act appears to be unique among the 
world’s antitrust statutes in permitting treble damages for 
direct purchases from effective cartels.  Harding and Joshua, 
Regulating Cartels in Europe 236-239  In the case of the 
vitamins cartel, if U.S. buyers actually recovered treble 
damages, this alone would have amounted to about 45% of 




Respondents be permitted to proceed, private recovery could 
amount to 300% of global damages instead of 45%.  Clearly 
the question of standing can mightily affect the ability of 
private antitrust actions to deter international price fixing. 
Because of various practical impediments, private 
plaintiffs have rarely if ever attained treble damages. 
Historically, what has been observed for domestic price-
fixing cases is that direct purchasers have recouped on 
average less than single damages.  See Lande, “Are Antitrust 
‘Treble’ Damages Really Single Damages?,” 54 Ohio State 
L. J. 115, 171 (1993).
21  The recovery rate for contemporary 
international cartels is also below single damages; only three 
examples could be found of settlements above single 
damages, and none as high as double damages.  Private 
International Cartels App. Table 6B at 129-31.
22  However, 
if wholly foreign direct buyers were to be permitted to bring 
treble-damage suits in U.S. courts, recoveries at historical 
rates would push total private recoveries to an average of 
about 75% of global overcharges.
23 Combined with fines, 
                                                 
21 Recovery by indirect purchasers is available to residents of less 
than half of the States.  Settlement amounts in indirect purchaser 
suits against vitamins defendants are difficult to document because 
most terms are confidential, but are believed to be well under 
single damages in all cases, typically a small percentage of 
damages.  Indirect-purchaser suits of international cartels 
prosecuted by coalitions of state attorneys-general are of a similar 
order of magnitude.  In 2001 a coalition of state attorneys general 
negotiated a record $255 million settlement for sales to indirect 
purchasers with the six leading vitamins cartel defendants, less 
than 4% of global injuries.  See “Ryan Announces Historic $255 
Million Antitrust Settlements Against International Vitamin 
Cartel,” PR Newswire, October 10, 2000. 
22 The median ratio of settlement payouts to overcharges is 76%.  
Private International Cartels 59 (Table 20). 
23 Information on legal costs for defendants is scanty.  In one well 
documented case (ADM  lysine), legal cost amounted to 9% of its 




these expanded private damages could approach optimal 
deterrence. 
    In sum, the maximum financial antitrust liability that 
would face global cartels in the absence of affirmance here 
would be, de jure, the sum of (1) five to six times the harm 
generated in the United States, (2) approximately single U.S. 
damages in the European Union, and (3) negligible fines or 
penalties elsewhere.  As noted above, the injuries caused by 
global cartels spread beyond North America and Western 
Europe.  Therefore, as a proportion of the monopoly profits 
garnered worldwide, the theoretical upper limit of lawful 
antitrust liability would be limited to approximately double 
global damages.  De facto the application of fines and private 
suits to global cartels has resulted in total monetary sanctions 
that have been less than double actual global damages in all 
cases and less than single damages on average.  In the end, 
then, even international cartels that are uncovered and 
prosecuted tend to be profitable. As explained below, such 
sanctions offer woefully suboptimal deterrence, but under 
the reading of the Sherman Act adopted below, deterrence 
might approach optimal levels. 
  5. THE VITAMINS CARTEL’S SANCTIONS.   
    The first source of monetary sanctions imposed upon 
the participants in the vitamins cartels were government 
fines, first imposed on the vitamins defendants by U.S. 
courts in a series of guilty pleas beginning in 1999.  All who 
are likely to plead appear now to have done so, with a total 
of $907 million collected in criminal fines. Canada was next 
with criminal fines of $100 million paid.  The EU imposed 
administrative fines of $759 million in 2001.
24  Australia 
ordered a fine of $14 million and South Korea $3 million.  
Private International Cartels 56. Japan and Switzerland 
                                                 
24  These fines are under appeal and could be reduced, as they 





issued warnings to members of the cartel, but no fines. While 
Brazil and other jurisdictions are investigating the vitamins 
cartel, no further major fines are expected to be imposed in 
this case. 
    The second major source of sanctions is private 
actions by direct buyers, principally in the United States. 
Several federal cases have been resolved, with a total to date 
of $596 million in recovery and legal fees and costs. The 
biggest gap in our knowledge of the amount of sanctions is 
the size of the settlements for opt-outs from the so-called 
domestic “all-vitamins” class action, In re: Vitamins 
Antitrust Litigation, Misc. No. 99-197 (D.D.C.).  About 225 
companies of the 4000 original class-action plaintiffs opted 
to litigate on their own.  As these opt-outs represented more 
than 75% of class purchases, their settlements are likely to be 
substantial.  Assuming that they will settle for a somewhat 
larger percentage of affected sales than those buyers that 
remained in the class, amicus Connor estimates the total 
payout to be in the range of $1200 to $2400 million.  Similar 
civil actions are being litigated in Australia and Canada but 
are unlikely to result in large recoveries.  In the EU and the 
rest of the world civil liability is negligible for-price fixing 
violations.  Harding and Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe: 
A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency 236-239 
(2003). While single damages are permitted in theory in a 
few European national courts, various practical impediments 
exist.  Id.  
    To summarize, if foreign sales like those at issue in 
the instant case are not unlawful as a matter of American 
law, so that the Government must calculate base fines solely 
on the basis of domestic affected sales, then the maximum 
fine on international cartels by the United States, Canadian, 
and EU authorities will typically amount to less than double 
the damage caused by the cartel in the United States.  Civil 
liability is confined almost entirely to the U.S. court system 




international cartel confined its sales solely to the U.S. 
market, its members might face the prospect of treble or 
quadruple damages, but few international cartels are 
configured this way.
25  Rather, sales and profits made in the 
U.S. market are typically less than one-third or one-fourth of 
the total.  In such cases, fines and penalties in all 
jurisdictions will be less than global monopoly profits.  
    In the specific case of the vitamins cartel, the total 
antitrust fines and penalties are reckoned to be between $4.4 
and $5.6 billion.  But, as was shown above, the best 
estimates of the cartel’s monopoly profits in all areas of the 
world are $9 to $13 billion.  The criminal and civil justice 
systems of the globe thus have failed to recover more than 
half of the cartel’s illegal profits. 
6. THE VITAMINS CARTEL IS NOT ATYPICAL. 
Most of the other international cartels of 1990s resemble 
the vitamins cartel in their operation, effectiveness, and 
sanctions imposed:
26 
•  Vitamins are organic chemicals; 49 of the 167 products 
that were the subject of price-fixing cartels uncovered by 
authorities between January 1990 and July 2003 were in 
organic chemicals markets. 
•  The vitamins conspirators were almost all manufacturers; 
the great majority of global cartelists are manufacturers. 
•  One-fourth of all international cartels sold to dispersed 
customers in the food and agricultural industries; half of 
the bulk vitamins ended up in animal feeds. 
                                                 
25  Only 18 cases out of 167 modern international cartels were 
configured this way. Private International Cartels App. Table 3 at 
115-120.  
26 These facts are drawn Private International Cartels, passim, and 




•  The typical international cartel made less than half of its 
revenues in North America and the EU; so did the 
vitamins cartel. 
•  The median number of companies forming international 
cartels was five; the median number of companies 
involved in the vitamins cartel with respect to each 
product was three. 
•  More than 80% of international price fixers are 
headquartered in the EU or Japan; in vitamins it was 
80%. 
•  No international cartel sold a differentiated consumer 
product; vitamins are unique chemicals sold to other 
manufacturers. 
•  In common with all other cartels, the vitamins cartel 
needed to combat the effects of international arbitrage on 
prices in high-prices regions. 
•  The mean duration of the vitamins cartel with respect to 
each product was 69 months; for all global cartels, 60 
months; for all international cartels uncovered in 1996-
1999, 75 months. 
•  The global financial antitrust penalties imposed on the 
vitamins conspirators was 31% to 58% of economic 
harm caused; for international cartels affecting 29 
products, the mean was 55%. 
•  The total financial antitrust penalties imposed on the 
vitamins conspirators was 12% to 16% of affected sales; 
the mean ratio for international cartels affecting 65 
products was 12%. 
7. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL RECIDIVISM. 
    Several of the vitamins manufacturers have been 
fined previously for price-fixing violations under U.S. or EU 
competition law.  Global Price Fixing 499-500.  F. 




engaged in an overlapping price-fixing agreement with 
respect to 12 vitamin products.  Roche, one of the two 
companies identified as the ringleaders of the vitamins cartel, 
was fined $14 million by the United States in 1997 for its 
leading role in the citric acid cartel of 1991-1995.  Global 
Price Fixing 395.  Roche executives were obligated to 
provide full cooperation in antitrust matters by virtue of 
Roche’s guilty plea in the citric acid case, yet they continued 
to conspire on vitamins prices for two more years.   
Moreover, there was testimony given at trial in 1998 in U.S. 
v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762 (N.D. Ill.), that F. Hoffman-
LaRoche had been a member of another, clandestine 
international cartel in the citric acid market in the late 1980s. 
Global Price Fixing 136.  Although a U.S. pharmaceutical 
company was allegedly a member, this earlier citric acid 
conspiracy was never uncovered by any antitrust 
authorities.
27 Thus, there is credible evidence that Roche is a 
true recidivist is the narrowest sense of the term. 
    Roche is not the only convicted member of the 
vitamins cartel to be fined for international price fixing in 
another line of business.  The large French chemical 
manufacturer Rhône-Poulenc, which in 1999 merged with 
the leading German chemical firm Höchst to form Aventis, 
was subsequently given amnesty in 1999 by the European 
Commission for its role in the global conspiracy in the 
market for the amino acid methionine.  Private International 
Cartels  Table A.1.  Höchst itself, which conspired with 
respect to vitamin B12, was convicted and fined $36 million 
                                                 
27 Unrebutted testimony in the same trial also revealed that two of 
the Japanese members of the global lysine cartel had thrice 
previously formed both international and domestic U.S. cartels in 
the lysine market.  Connor, “‘Our Customers Are Our Enemies:’ 
The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995,” 18 Review of Industrial 
Organization 5, 6-7 (2001). Thus, two of the five lysine 
defendants convicted by the United States in 1996 had by that time 




by the United States in 1998 for its role in the global sorbates 
cartel; in 2003 the EU imposed a fine of $116 million on 
Höchst (by then Aventis) for the sorbates violation.  Id.   
Thus, three of the co-conspirators in the vitamins cartels are 
known to have fixed prices in previous or concurrent 
international cartels that operated in the 1990s.  Doubtless 
there are other instances of repeated violations of the 
antitrust laws by other members of the vast vitamins cartel 
that have not been discovered or publicly reported. 
    These three examples drawn for the vitamins case are 
neither isolated nor merely anecdotal.  The phenomenon of 
repeated violations of the antitrust laws of the United States 
and the European Union has been the subject of scholarly 
examination.  See Private International Cartels App. Table 5 
at 124-125.  This research collects information on 
international cartels involving 167 different products that 
were uncovered by one or more of the world’s antitrust 
authorities between January 1990 and July 2003.  These data 
are believed to be reasonably complete.  Out of the hundreds 
of companies identified as participants in these cartels, more 
than 50 companies participated in contemporary cartels with 
respect to two or more of these products.  Id.
28  Five 
companies are known to have participated in price-fixing 
cartels with respect to ten or more products, and 13 in cartels 
with respect to five or more.  There are a few instances of 
true recidivism, but most of the cases just mentioned are 
matters of companies colluding in overlapping agreements 
with respect to multiple product lines. For example, the 
Dutch chemical maker Akzo Nobel engaged in international 
price-fixing agreements concerning ten product lines: 
choline chloride (vitamin B4), sodium gluconate, MCAA, 
soda ash, explosives, auto paints, organic peroxides, PVC 
                                                 
28  Some of these companies were also convicted or fined as 
members of purely domestic cartels or of international cartels that 
were active in periods prior to 1990.  Thus, these data on repeated 




additives, rubber processing chemicals, and MBS.  Id. 124.  
Perhaps it is best to call such behavior serial price fixing.   
  8. DETERRING INTERNATIONAL CARTELS. 
    The fact that so many companies engage in repeated 
violations of U.S. and EU competition laws is symptomatic 
of deeply rooted business behavior.  The roots of price-fixing 
conduct lie in the structures of markets.  See, e.g., Global 
Price Fixing 522-527; Private International Cartels  8-11.  
Common to all discovered cartels is “small numbers” (a high 
degree of industrial concentration of ownership among 
sellers) coupled with a high degree of control of the market 
by members of the cartel.  Similarly, cartels are more 
effective when buyers are many and none purchase large 
shares of the cartelized product. A third nearly universal 
feature of markets with cartel activity is that the products are 
standardized commodities with few or no substitutes even 
when a cartel raises its price to a level well above normal. 
Storable products that are cheaply transported long distances 
make better candidates for internationally collusive schemes 
than perishable items.
29   
The vitamins cartel illustrates the importance of these 
market characteristics.  Global market concentration was 
high (the top four or five firms accounted for more than 75% 
of production), the cartel members comprised the top tier of 
manufacturers, more than ten thousand companies purchased 
bulk vitamins directly from the cartel, the biological 
functions of vitamins insured their uniqueness in demand, 
and high vitamin prices permitted long-distance trade.    
                                                 
29 The members of the lysine cartel for example were convicted for 
their price agreements in the dry lysine market. Liquid lysine, 
which sold for less than $0.50 per pound and could not be 
transported economically by tanker vehicles more than a few 
hundred miles from the plants in which it was made was not 




    Beyond these three characteristics are a number of 
market features that generally facilitate overt collusion but 
that may not be necessary conditions.  Cartelized markets 
tend to be mature; growth tends to be steady and predictable; 
rapid changes in product design or in methods of 
manufacture tend to be things in the past.
30  Transactions are 
typically made through private bilateral negotiations that are 
not directly observable to third parties, and most sales are 
made by means of long term supply contracts.  Terms of sale 
(delivery services, quantity discounts, rebates, recognized 
grades, quality premiums, etc.) have long been standardized 
throughout the industry.  Leading companies may have had 
years of strategic interaction with one another.  Barriers to 
entry are formidable, thus severely limiting the number of 
potential entrants should prices rise significantly.  Again, the 
markets for bulk vitamins by and large display these 
facilitating factors. 
    Such a mix of market characteristics is found in only 
a minority of the world’s industries.  The structures and 
practices in the manufacturing and mining industries foster 
cartelization, whereas the organization of retail sales of 
manufactures does not.  Manufacturing of organic chemicals 
embodies them, while production of inorganic chemicals 
does not. 
The import of these observations is that collusion is 
rational in some industries but foolhardy in others.  By 
calling collusion “rational” economists intend to characterize 
cooperative business choices that are expected to generate 
greater profits than alternative strategies.  See generally 
Polinsky and Shavell, “The Economic Theory of Public 
                                                 
30 Cartel formation is frequently, perhaps usually preceded by an 
actual or impending “crisis” (as perceived by cartel members): 
markedly slowing growth, falling prices, rising inventories, low 
rates of capacity utilization or similar conditions that have caused 
or are about to cause profits to decline to what are by the standards 




Enforcement of the Law,” 38 J. Economic Literature 45 
(2000); Posner, Antitrust Law 266-274 (2d ed.  2001).  The 
field of legal economics that studies crime and punishment is 
founded on the idea that persons choose crime because the 
anticipated benefits exceed the expected losses.  When the 
benefits (monopoly profits) exceed the losses (antitrust fines 
and penalties), deterrence will not be achieved.
31 
    There are two major reasons why it is rational for 
firms contemplating global price fixing to proceed.  First, 
actual cartel profits have historically exceeded the financial 
penalties meted out by the world’s courts and commissions.  
It is reasonable to suppose that future expectations about the 
benefit/cost ratio of international price fixing will be 
tempered by historical experience. As this brief has 
demonstrated, the total collusive overcharges imposed by the 
vitamins cartel greatly exceeded the global fines and 
penalties extracted from the cartelists.  This result follows 
from the leniency policies of the most active anticartel 
authorities, from the difficulties of plaintiffs in U.S. civil 
suits in achieving double or even single damages, from the 
absence of civil suits abroad, and from the near absence of 
any kind of enforcement outside North America and the 
EU.
32  The facts regarding anticartel sanctions presented 
above support a similar conclusion in the case of other global 
cartels uncovered since 1990.  
                                                 
31 When they are equal, deterrence is said to be optimal.  Optimal 
deterrence theory usually assumes that the government has no 
residual uncertainty and that would-be corporate criminals are 
risk-neutral.  If a corporation is instead risk-avoiding, the optimal 
punishment level for the same level of anticipated benefits will be 
lower.   
32 Of course some cartels are uncovered and sued only by private 
parties, but the reverse is by far the most common pattern.  Once 
one antitrust authority is alerted to the existence of a cartel, these 




    Second, global cartelists have reason to expect that 
their secret price fixing will probably remain hidden.  The 
probability of being apprehended by one or more of the 
world’s antitrust authorities is not known with certainty, but 
it is certainly less than 100%.  The most reliable sources 
assert that the probability of any kind of private cartel being 
caught before the agreement is dissolved for other reasons is 
in the range of 10% to 33%.  See Private International 
Cartels 63 (collecting sources).
33  It is true that most of these 
estimates date from periods before the full force of today’s 
U.S. criminal sanctions and leniency inducements were felt.  
Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that the true 
probability of detection is outside this range.
34  
   E ven if corporate antitrust fines and penalties were to 
be applied in Europe and North America at their maximum 
levels, the low probability of detection alone may still result 
in suboptimal deterrence.  When one also considers the 
application of leniency policies in the negotiation of fines, 
the absence of criminal enforcement outside of two 
continents, and the inability of injured parties to seek civil 
restitution outside of North America, the profitability of 
global price fixing is assured.  An approach such as that 
taken by the court below is necessary if the enforcement of 
American law is to have any realistic hope of protecting 
American consumers and the American economy by 
approaching optimal levels of deterrence of anticompetitive 
behavior by international price-fixing cartels.  
                                                 
33 The legal-economic literature on this point is scanty.  Seven 
sources are cited on the page cited in the text.  The only empirical 
economic study finds a 13% to 17% discovery rate. Even after 
detection, successful prosecution of objectively guilty 
international conspiracies is uncertain.  
34  Polinsky and Shavell note that arrest rates for the most common 
felonious property crimes are between 13% and 17%.  Polinsky 
and Shavell, “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of the 





    Modern international cartels with global reach 
present a knotty challenge to current antitrust enforcement 
practices. 
    Cartels that sell internationally tradable commodities 
and that aim to fix prices in two or more regions with 
different national currencies cannot control currency 
exchange rates.  As a consequence, private international 
cartels must prevent geographic arbitrage through frequent 
realignment of national prices if their control over price is to 
succeed.  The vitamins cartels and scores of the largest 
cartels uncovered by antitrust authorities since 1990 embody 
these characteristics, and direct evidence exists that cartel 
managers in fact were aware that unchecked arbitrage would 
undermine their scheme. Therefore, the purchases of wholly 
foreign buyers play an integral role in creating the antitrust 
injury incurred by wholly domestic direct purchasers.    
    Even under ideal prosecutorial outcomes, in the 
absence of affirmance of the decision below, the global reach 
of modern cartels insures that the monetary payouts of guilty 
international cartelists cannot succeed in disgorging all the 
illegal cartel profits.  That is, the imposition of maximum 
government fines combined with fully successful civil suits 
in North America will inevitably result in amounts less than 
single global damages.  It would therefore be utterly rational 
for would-be cartelist to form or join an international price-
fixing conspiracy.  Only if treble damages are available to 
wholly foreign buyers might the balance tip: if plaintiffs like 
Respondents are successful in American courts, the 
monetary penalties imposed on prosecuted members of 
cartels could, at least in theory, in most cases exceed the 
monopoly profits.  Cartel formation will be discouraged. 
  Even assuming prosecutorial conditions will resemble 
recent historical patterns of punishment, a judgment of 




deterrence and will lead it to approach optimal deterrence.  
The precise degree of deterrence will depend on the 
perceived probability that international cartels will be 
detected, investigated, and convicted.  It is widely believed 
that the probability of detecting clandestine cartels is less 
than one-third. The degree of deterrence will also depend on 
the proportion of the price-fixing overcharges awarded to 
plaintiffs in civil suits, which on average has been less than 
100% and in individual cases never exceeds double damages.  
If these estimates are correct and conditions remain 
unchanged, permitting wholly foreign buyers to seek redress 
for antitrust injury in U.S. courts, will mean that typical 
would-be cartelists will face, if not an optimal level of 
deterrence, the likelihood of a much smaller degree of 
underdeterrence than exists today.   
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